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Rhetorical Naturalisation in the History of Philology: August Schleicher, Friedrich Max 
Müller and Their Critics 
 
Angus Nicholls1  
 
Introduction 
An intellectual history of the humanities can only fulfil its true critical purpose if, in examining 
debates from the past, it can say something important about the present. This essay examines 
an episode in the history of nineteenth-century philology – in German: Sprachwissenschaft, or 
what Friedrich Max Müller termed ‘The Science of Language’ – an episode that appeared to 
reach its resolution towards the end of that century, but which still contains implications that 
are of relevance today. The decisive issue in this debate is whether philology should be 
regarded as a natural science that proceeds according to empirically verifiable laws. Two of 
the key actors in this debate – August Schleicher (1821-1861) in Germany and Friedrich Max 
Müller (1823-1900) in Britain – sought to mobilise their own versions of Darwinian natural 
selection to claim that something like a ‘Science of Language’ can be formulated in a way 
analogous to evolutionary biology.2 At the risk of coining German-inspired neologisms and of 
using certain English words in a manner that departs from their everyday senses, I will argue 
that Schleicher’s and Müller’s claims were made as part of what I will call the rhetoric of 
empiricisation (German: Empirisierung) and naturalisation (Naturalisierung), rather than on 
the basis of strictly logical scientific argumentation, since neither Schleicher nor Müller seem 
to have understood what Darwin meant by natural selection, and both of their positions 
fluctuated in order to accommodate Darwin and to harness his scientific prestige, even if 
                                                        
1 This paper was originally published in German as “Rhetorische Naturalisierung in der Sprachwissenschaft: 
August Schleicher, Friedrich Max Müller und ihre Kritiker,” in Empirisierung des Transzendentalen. 
Erkenntnisbedingungen in Kunst und Wissenschaft 1850-1920, ed. Philip Ajouri and Benjamin Specht (Göttingen: 
Wallstein, 2019), 191-222. It emerged from the German Research Foundation (DFG) research group 
Empirisierung des Transzendentalen, directed by Ajouri and Specht, which met, roughly in the format of the 
legendary Poetik und Hermeneutik research group, over a number of sessions between 2014 and 2017. The group 
produced the essay collection cited above, as well as a special section of Scientia Poetica 19, no. 1 (2015) and a 
special issue of the journal KulturPoetik 17, no. 1 (2017). Some of the material presented in this paper also appears 
in: Angus Nicholls, “A Germanic Reception in England: Friedrich Max Müller's Critique of Darwin's Descent of 
Man,” in The Literary and Cultural Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe, vol. 3, ed. Thomas F. Glick and 
Elinor Shaffer, (London: Bloomsbury, 2014,) 78-100; and in John Davis and Angus Nicholls, “Friedrich Max 
Müller: The Career and Intellectual Trajectory of a German Philologist in Victorian Britain,” Publications of the 
English Goethe Society 85, no. 2-3 (2016): 67-97. All translations from the German in this essay are my own. 
 
2 Given the historical focus of this essay, dates of birth and death are supplied for the key figures discussed, in 
order to give a sense of generational relations between thinkers.  
 2 
Müller’s religious convictions would later lead him into an at times bitter public dispute with 
Darwin and his followers on the question of human descent.3  
It is here where the neologism empiricisation requires further elaboration. As Philip 
Ajouri and Benjamin Specht note in their introduction to a special issue of Scientia Poetica on 
this topic, Empirisierung is a term used to describe a process through which fields of 
knowledge attempted to render themselves scientific – in the sense of natural scientific, or of 
‘physical science’ in the language of mid nineteenth-century British materialism and positivism 
– in the period leading up to and following what came to be known as the great crisis or “crash” 
(“großer Krach”) of German idealism.4 Ajouri and Specht note here the importance of Darwin’s 
thought in general for these processes of Empirisierung. Yet here they also observe that around 
the 1870s in Germany, Darwinism still tended to be understood through the lenses of idealism 
and the philosophy of history, namely as describing a process of teleological or dialectical 
development, rather than as a theory that combines random variation with processes of 
selection within specific environmental contexts.5  
The case of Darwin, or of a vague and generalised ‘Darwinism,’ points to an important 
distinction that must be made between Empirisierung on the one hand and naturalisation or 
Naturalisierung on the other. In this context, the latter term decidedly does not mean to adopt 
the citizenship of the country in which one lives as an immigrant (as it normally does in 
English), but it does nonetheless share the sense of legitimisation or normalisation associated 
with this word. Michael Heidelberger’s contribution to the aforementioned special issue of 
Scientia Poetica offers a useful discussion of this term. Naturalisierung, he argues, refers to an 
incremental process through which phenomena are increasingly explained in terms of physical 
forces resident in nature or what William James (1842-1910) termed “blind physical forces.”6 
                                                        
3 Müller’s debate with Darwin on the origin of language has generated an extensive secondary literature which 
cannot be discussed here; for a brief overview that refers to the numerous secondary sources, see Davis and 
Nicholls, “Friedrich Max Müller,” 90-95. 
 
4 This now well-known phrase was coined by Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) in Hartmann, Dühring und Lange. 
Zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie im XIX. Jahrhundert. Ein kritischer Essay (Iserlohn: Baedecker, 1876), 
1. 
 
5 Philip Ajouri and Benjamin Specht, “Empirisierung des Transzendentalen. Epistemologische Vorraussetzungen 
und Erscheinungsformen der Moderne in Wissenschaft, Literatur und Kunst um 1900,” Scientia Poetica 19, 
(2015): 181-204 (here: 184-187). See also Philip Ajouri, “Darwinism in German Speaking Literature (1859-
c.1890),” in The Literary and Cultural Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe, vol. 3, ed. Thomas F. Glick and 
Elinor Shaffer (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 17-45; here: 17-25. 
 
6 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longman, Green and 
Co. 1907), 96. 
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Here the purpose of Naturalisierung is to eliminate or reduce speculative or non-empirical 
explanations, especially those which are not ‘blind’ in that they imply a directedness or 
teleology attributed by human minds to nature.7   
Heidelberger helpfully points out that Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) critical 
philosophy – which only allows the “concept of natural purposes” (“Begriff der Naturzwecke”) 
to be used in the natural sciences as a heuristic guiding principle, describing it as a “Fremdling 
in der Naturwissenschaft” (“stranger in the natural sciences”) – subscribed to this form of 
Naturalisierung.8 For Kant, according to Heidelberger, naturalisation is completely acceptable 
within the realm of human experience (the realm of phenomena): “Außerhalb des 
transzendentalen Bereichs ist der Naturalismus für Kant nicht nur nicht verboten, sondern sogar 
gefordert” (“outside of the transcendental realm, naturalism is for Kant not only not forbidden, 
rather it is even stipulated”).9 But the example of Kant demonstrates that not all phenomena 
can be subjected to complete physical-causal (that is: completely empirical) explanation. There 
are, thinks Kant, also phenomena that condition our perception of phenomena and which 
therefore must be transcendentally interpreted, such as mathematics, which serves as the a 
priori basis for empirical natural sciences such as physics, and here one could also mention the 
role played by transcendental elements of reason deployed in the cognition of organisms as 
natural purposes in biology. Naturalisierung thus presents itself as a unique phenomenon – 
differentiated from empiricism – since it can only ever be partial, and is more akin to a process 
than a finished state of affairs, a movement towards the goal of full Empirisierung. Although, 
according to Heidelberger, every Naturalisierung presents itself as a would-be Empirisierung, 
this process of rendering the transcendental empirical is not automatically complete or even 
completable in many cases.10  Similarly, Gillian Beer, in her important book on the literary 
reception of Darwin, describes “naturalisation” as marking a transition from the ‘as if’ or 
speculative elements of a theory to that theory’s eventual acceptance as an objectively testable 
cognition of empirical things existing in the real world.11 
                                                        
7 Michael Heidelberger, “Naturalisierung des Transzendentalen in der Sinnesphysiologie von Hermann von 
Helmholtz,” Scientia Poetica 19 (2015): 205-233 (here: 206, 209). 
 
8 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Werkausgabe, 12 vols., ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp 1968), 10: 340 (§72). 
 
9 Heidelberger, “Naturalisierung des Transzendentalen,” 207. 
 
10 Heidelberger, “Naturalisierung des Transzendentalen,” 208. 
 
11 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction (1983; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2 
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Like Ajouri and Specht, Heidelberger also notes that a general philosophy of 
‘Darwinism’ contributed to processes of Naturalisierung during the latter stages of the 
nineteenth century, pointing to Schleicher’s and Ernst Haeckel’s (1834-1919) monism. 
Naturalisierung, according to Heidelberger, may be both ontological and methodological. 
Ontological Naturalisierung implies a general worldview in which material causation is 
favoured over non-material explanations, while methodological Naturalisierung seeks to 
substantiate this worldview through the methods of the empirical natural sciences.12 In their 
introduction to the Scientia Poetica issue, Ajouri and Specht point out that Sprachwissenschaft 
or philology was one of the main fields in which Empirisierung became a matter of key 
importance.13 But in the cases of Schleicher and Müller, we are arguably dealing more with 
would-be Naturalisierung than with Empirisierung, since neither thinker developed an 
empirical method through which to test their linguistic theories. To Heidelberger’s categories 
of ontological and methodological Naturalisierung I would add one more descriptor: 
rhetorical. This is because there is significant doubt as to whether Schleicher’s and particularly 
Müller’s uses of Darwin implied even a merely ontological commitment to what Darwin 
understood by natural selection; moreover, in both cases, and as will be shown below, a 
methodological commitment to Darwinian natural selection is completely out of the question. 
In short: I will argue that with respect to Schleicher and Müller, ‘Darwinism’ is probably not 
an ontology; rather it is a metaphor or an analogy that is used rhetorically to characterise 
philology as a natural science, within the broader context of increasing disciplinary competition 
between the humanities and the natural sciences. 
The central metaphor used by Schleicher and Müller to graft ‘Darwinism’ onto 
linguistics was that of the organism. In this philological context, the word organism was not 
deployed merely in the heuristic or regulative sense favoured by Kant in his Kritik der 
Urteilskraft (Critique of the Power of Judgement, 1790).14 Rather, in Schleicher’s and Müller’s 
usage, this word amounts to an ontological assertion with realistic and positivistic (that is: 
natural scientific) pretensions. If, following Hans Blumenberg, we can claim that pre-rational 
or metaphorical thinking can play an orienting role in scientific research programmes, albeit a 
role which cannot necessarily be cashed out in the manner demanded of ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’ 
                                                        
12 Heidelberger, “Naturalisierung des Transzendentalen,” 210-211, 206. 
 
13 Ajouri and Specht, “Empirisierung des Transzendentalen,” 190-192. 
 
14 See, in particular, §§64-65. 
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concepts by René Descartes (1596-1650),15 then one important aspect of philology during the 
second half of the nineteenth century can be found in the progressive decline in plausibility of 
this language-as-organism metaphor.  The consequences of this decline for the scientific status 
of philology were immense, precisely because the metaphor of the organism was so heavily 
laden with the scientific pathos of Naturalisierung. At stake was nothing less that the status of 
philology as a supposed natural science. 
The use of biological metaphors – the Stamm (stem) Wurzel (root) – to describe 
language development has a history in German comparative philology that goes back to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.16 As early as 1808, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) 
claimed that comparative linguistics could shed light on the phenomenon of language in the 
same way that comparative anatomy had done in the natural sciences,17 while Franz Bopp 
(1791-1867) opens his Vergleichende Grammatik (Comparative Grammar, 1833) by arguing 
that languages are organisms characterised by physical and mechanical laws.18 In Die Deutsche 
Sprache (The German Language, 1860), Schleicher continues and intensifies this tradition by 
claiming, in a similar way to Bopp, that languages are “Naturorganismen” (natural organisms) 
not only because they can be classified according to “Gattungen” or (genera or species), but 
also on account of their alleged independent growth according to natural laws that are beyond 
human control.19 Following his encounter with Darwin, and in light of Darwin’s rising prestige 
within British science, Müller would make similar claims: language “roots” are for Müller the 
“phonetic cells” that one can find “in the crucible after the most careful analysis of human 
language,” and Müller describes this scientific procedure as amounting to a “Biology of 
language.”20 In Müller’s “Science of Language” – as in the case of Schleicher – language is 
described as a natural phenomenon that grows beyond human control.21 
                                                        
15 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (1960; Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, 1998). 
 
16 See Andreas Gardt, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland Vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 268-281. 
 
17 Friedrich Schlegel, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer 1808), 28. 
 
18 Franz Bopp, Vergleichende Grammatik des Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Litthauischen, 
Gothischen und Deutschen, 3 vols, (Berlin: Dümmler, 1833), 1: iii. 
  
19 August Schleicher, Die Deutsche Sprache (Stuttgart: Cotta 1860), 33. 
 
20 Friedrich Max Müller, “Lectures on Mr. Darwin’s Philosophy of Language, Third Lecture,” Fraser’s Magazine, 
[London], July 1873, 2-24; here: 2-3. 
 
21 Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, First Series (London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 
1861), 36. 
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The problem that was quickly identified by Schleicher’s and Müller’s critics lies 
precisely in the fact that languages are not empirical objects in the same way as cells or plants. 
Moreover, while changes in a language may be beyond the control of any individual speaker, 
human discourse communities nonetheless play a role in how languages develop. For these 
important reasons, the language-as-organism hypothesis could only lay claim to a metaphorical 
status.  As we shall see, these arguments were made against Schleicher by Heymann Steinthal 
(1823-1899), and against both Schleicher and Müller by William Dwight Whitney (1827-
1894).  Both Steinthal and Whitney were instrumental in exposing Schleicher’s and Müller’s 
rhetoric of Naturalisierung, while also moving linguistics towards the model which became 
enshrined in the pages of Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1857-1913) posthumously published Cours 
de linguistique générale (Course in General Linguistics, 1916). This model would move away 
from claiming that languages are akin to organic and empirical objects, and would instead focus 
on languages as contingent cultural institutions determined by usage in discourse communities.   
The contemporary relevance of this essay for my own discipline of literary studies lies 
in the fact that Saussure’s model of linguistics, which emphasises precisely the arbitrary and 
institutional character of language as opposed to any purported natural status, came to function 
as one of the dominant paradigms for literary theory during the twentieth-century, 
underpinning not only Russian formalism – Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), Vladimir Propp 
(1895-1970), Mikhail  Bahktin (1895-1975), and others – but also French structuralism and 
poststructuralism: Roland Barthes (1915-1980), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and their many 
North American adherents. In the recent ‘culture wars’ of literary studies, it is precisely 
structuralism and post-structuralism that have been targeted by literary theorists who once 
again wish to provide the discipline with an empirical or natural scientific underpinning by 
making two important claims about literary texts and more generally about narrative: first, that 
narratives may originally have provided a means of orientation towards reality that would have 
aided survival and therefore have been an object of natural selection22; and second: that literary 
texts are even best interpreted in relation to this purported evolutionary function.23 While the 
first claim may generally be plausible if unprovable and largely trivial for the purposes of 
interpretation, the second would reduce literary texts to expressing a substrate of biological 
functions, suggesting, to cite just one notorious example, that Jane Austen’s Pride and 
                                                        
22 See, for example, Karl Eibl, Anima Poeta: Bausteine der biologischen Literatur- und Kulturtheorie (Paderborn: 
Mentis, 2004). 
 
23 Joseph Carroll, Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature and Literature, (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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Prejudice is primarily concerned with sexual selection.24 Today, as in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Sirens’ song of Naturalisierung remains attractive to literary scholars 
wishing to harness the prestige of the natural sciences.  
These broader issues to do with the history of literary studies cannot be explored in depth 
here.25 But on the basis that nineteenth-century philology was one of the primary generative 
forces behind modern literary studies, my purpose here is to examine to what extent philology 
sought to accommodate, and to what extent it eventually resisted, the empirical impulses of the 
Darwinian revolution. The two thinkers treated here – August Schleicher and Friedrich Max 
Müller, both German Sanskritists or Indo-Germanists by training, the former working in Jena 
and the latter in Oxford – took very different approaches to Darwin. Schleicher wanted to 
transform philology into what he called “die Glottik” or glottics: a purported natural science 
that deals with languages as “organisms.”26 For Müller, by contrast, much more was at stake 
than simply bolstering philology with or defending it against Darwinism; in fact, his eventual 
and paradoxical aim was to use a Kantian version of philology to refute Darwin’s theory of 
human descent, while at the same time maintaining that natural selection is operative in 
language change and that the study of language is a science akin to biology. 
 
The Fate of Philology During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century 
As James Turner has shown in a recent publication, the broader relevance of Schleicher and 
Müller to the history of humanities lies in the fact that philology functioned as the forerunner 
to literary studies in both Germany and Britain.27 For this reason, many of the empirical and 
would-be natural scientific impulses found in philology of the 1860s and 1870s carried over 
into literary studies proper when it began to emerge as an academic discipline in the 1880s in 
both nations. Here two brief examples must suffice to show the extent to which, at its inception, 
literary studies both modelled itself on philology and saw the need to establish itself as being 
akin to a natural science.  
                                                        
24 See Carroll’s chapter “Human Nature and Literary Meaning: A Theoretical Model Illustrated with a Critique of 
Pride and Prejudice,” in Literary Darwinism, 187-218. 
 
25 See Angus Nicholls, “Scientific Literary Criticism in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey and Matthew Arnold,” 
Comparative Critical Studies 8, no. 1 (2011): 7-31. 
 
26 August Schleicher, Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft. Offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Dr. 
Ernst Häckel, 2nd ed. (1863; Weimar: Böhlau, 1873), 7.  
 
27 See James Turner, Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014). See also Tuska Benes, In Babel’s Shadow: Language, Philology and the Nation in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2008).  
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Wilhelm Scherer (1841-1886), arguably the most important Germanist of the late 
nineteenth-century,28 is the most prominent example of this tendency in German criticism of 
the 1880s. A brief examination of the introduction to his posthumous Poetik (1888) 
demonstrates the following tendencies: the preference for an inductive and value-free approach 
to the objects of literary study in opposition to the making of speculative value judgements; a 
focus on the text as a product that emerges under particular conditions, and which demands a 
science that analyses the empirical “Bedingungen der Production” (“conditions of 
production”), which are chiefly history and biography; and finally a rehabilitation of philology 
as a science of comparison involving classification according to genera or Gattungen and “die 
Methode der wechselseitigen Erhellung” (“the method of reciprocal or comparative 
elucidation”).29 Scherer’s method was developed in collaboration with the early Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833-1911) and in relation to what Dilthey called the “psychische Tatsachen” 
(“psychological facts”) to be found in the Goethe-Archive in Weimar,30 facts which both 
Dilthey and Scherer thought would serve as the basis of a positivist literary criticism.31  
During the same decade that saw the publication of Scherer’s Poetik, a similar case of 
would-be scientific criticism was formulated in Britain, this time with Shakespeare as its 
object. In his Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist (1885), the prominent extramural educator and 
public lecturer Richard Green Moulton (1849-1924), an employee firstly of Cambridge 
University and later of the then new University of Chicago,32 seeks to “claim for Criticism a 
position amongst the Inductive Sciences.” For Moulton, just as “botany deals inductively with 
the phenomena of vegetable life and traces the laws underlying them […] so there is a criticism 
not less inductive in character which has for its subject-matter literature.”33 As in the case of 
                                                        
28 This is the judgement of Hans-Harald Müller in his portrait of Scherer. Hans-Harald Müller, “Wilhem Scherer 
(1841-1886)” in Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Germanistik in Porträts, ed. Christoph König, Hans-Harald 
Müller and Werner Röcke (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), 80-94; here: 80. 
29 Wilhelm Scherer, Poetik. Mit einer Einleitung und Materialien zur Rezeptionsanalyse, ed. Gunter Reiss, (1888; 
Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1977), 48-50. 
 
30 Wilhelm Dilthey, “Über die Einbildungskraft der Dichter,” in Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft 10 (1878): 42-104; here: 47. 
 
31 For context, see Wolfgang Kaltenbrunner, “Literary Positivism? Scientific Theories and Methods in the Work 
of Sainte-Beuve (1804-1869) and Wilhelm Scherer (1841-1886),” Studium 3 (2010): 74-88. 
 
32 Alexandra Laurie, “Richard Green Moulton (1849-1924)”, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
online: https://0-doi-org.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/48165 [Accessed 4 September 2019]. 
 
33 Richard Green Moulton, Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist: A Popular Illustration of the Principles of Scientific 
Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885), vi, 1. 
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Scherer, we find in Moulton the total avoidance of value judgements. For Moulton, there are 
two essential types of literary critic: “the judge and the investigator.” The former makes 
speculative judgements about “what ought to be” (i.e., judgements of taste), while the latter 
scientifically enquires into “what is.” The judge is subject to unfounded and a priori notions 
about literary value, while the investigator works inductively, analysing literary works to “get 
a close acquaintance with their phenomena,” and to identify new “species.”34  
The common themes found in both Scherer and Moulton – namely the avoidance of 
value judgements and the focus upon induction and classification – are broadly post-Darwinian 
in character. Because Darwin showed that natural and even human development can be 
explained without recourse to teleological ideas or notions of purpose, literary critics also felt 
the need to analyse literary works not solely in relation to their aesthetic value and purpose, 
but more in terms of their causation, formal properties, and modes of functioning. My claim is 
that this movement towards an inductive and empirical method in literary studies was predated 
by a similar tendency in philology during the 1860s and 1870s. Schleicher and Müller are cases 
in point, though the story that I will tell is far from being one of uniform accommodation of 
natural scientific materialism.  
 
August Schleicher: From Hegel to Darwin via Haeckel 
Today August Schleicher is best known as the developer of the Stammbaum theory of language 
development and his related efforts to reconstruct an Indogermanische Ursprache (Indo-
Germanic primal language). 
 
                                                        
34 Moulton, Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist, 2 
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Figure 1: August Schleicher’s Indo-Germanic Stammbaum, from Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik 
der indogermanischen Sprachen (Weimar: Böhlau, 1861). 
 
Schleicher’s attempts to explain language development, even as late as his monumental Die 
Deutsche Sprache of 1860, were essentially an amalgam of pre-Darwinian biological 
metaphors derived from Romanticism, combined with quasi-Hegelian ruminations on the 
historical development of languages and nations throughout history.  
In Die Deutsche Sprache, Schleicher continues this tradition by claiming, in a similar 
way to Bopp, that languages are “Naturorganismen” (“natural organisms”), not only because 
they can be classified according to “Gattungen” (“genera or species”), but also on account of 
their growth according to natural laws: 
 
Die Sprachen, diese aus lautlichem Stoffe gebildeten höchsten aller Naturorganismen, 
zeigen ihre Eigenschaft als Naturorganismen nicht nur darin, daß sie, wie diese, 
sämtlich in Gattungen, Arten, Unterarten u. s. f. sich ordnen, sondern auch durch ihr 
nach bestimmten Gesetzen verlaufendes Wachstum.35  
 
Languages, these highest of all natural organisms that are formed out of the substance 
of sounds, demonstrate their character as natural organisms not only because they allow 
                                                        
35 Schleicher, Die Deutsche Sprache, 33. 
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themselves to be collectively ordered according to genera, species, sub-species and so 
on, but also through their growth, which proceeds according to particular laws.  
 
As Darwinian as all this might sound, the theory of language found in Die Deutsche Sprache 
is underpinned by a view of history that is about as far from Darwin as one could possibly 
imagine. Die Deutsche Sprache appeared in the same year (1860) as Heinrich Georg Bronn’s 
(1800-1862) translation of On the Origin of Species (translated as Über die Entstehung der 
Arten), which explains why Schleicher would not have had time to incorporate Darwin’s ideas.  
Prior to 1860, Schleicher thought that most European languages had developed in a prehistoric 
period. What the present-day comparative philologist observes is the “Verfall” 
(“degeneration”) of languages after they have reached the “höchste Stufe” (“highest level”) of 
perfection. Once a language is fully developed and perfected, it allows the people to whom it 
belongs to become an historical (in the sense of politically active and expansive) entity. It is 
historical events (migrations, wars, interactions with other cultures) that lead a language to 
decline from its earlier peak of development. In this sense, Schleicher sees “Sprachbildung” 
(“language development”) and the forces of history as being in antagonism with one another 
in the development of cultures.36   
 With the appearance of Die Darwinische Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft (The 
Darwinian Theory and the Science of Language) in its first edition of 1863,37 Schleicher 
dispenses with this cyclical and highly speculative story of perfection followed by 
degeneration. In other words: during this period Schleicher’s theory of language undergoes a 
process of rhetorical Naturalisierung. By this time, Schleicher had been converted to a school 
of thought that William Whewell (1794-1866), paraphrasing the ideas of the geologist Charles 
Lyell (1797-1875) in his Principles of Geology (3 vols., 1830-33), dubbed 
“uniformitarianism”: the notion that, today as in the past, uniform and continuous geological 
processes underlie changes in the earth’s surface.38  This meant that Schleicher’s discontinuous 
                                                        
36 Schleicher, Die Deutsche Sprache, 35. See also Benes, In Babel’s Shadow, 230.  
 
37 August Schleicher, Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft. Offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Dr. 
Ernst Häckel (Weimar: Böhlau, 1863). 
 
38 William Whewell, review of Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology, being an Attempt to Explain the Former 
Changes of the Earth’s Surface, Quarterly Review 47 (1832): 103-32, see p. 126 for the discussion of 
“uniformitarianism.” Anna Morpurgo Davies points to the complexity of Schleicher’s position on 
uniformitarianism, observing that while his earlier narrative of perfection followed by decay was clearly “anti-
uniformitarian,” Schleicher may well have changed his view on this matter at a later point. See Anna Morpurgo 
Davies, History of Linguistics, Volume IV: Nineteenth-Century Linguistics (London: Longmans, 1992), 178, 190.  
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narrative about perfection followed by degeneration would need to be replaced by a new story 
dealing with a continuous, progressive and layered development in languages in a manner 
suggestive of Darwinian evolution by natural selection, a narrative underpinned by 
Schleicher’s ostentatious references to Lyell.39  
Addressing his text to his friend and mentor in things Darwinian, Ernst Haeckel, 
Schleicher now claims to have been a Darwinian before he read Darwin.40 The text is replete 
with ostentatious displays of its purported biological rigour: languages are organisms; language 
roots are the “Zellen” (“cells”) of language; language research utilises an exclusively natural 
scientific method based on the strict observation of established facts, and all subjective 
interpretation, endless etymologies, and vague speculations must be renounced at all costs.41 
The title of philology, tarnished by its associations with romanticism, idealism, Biblical 
hermeneutics and speculative thought, is to be replaced by “die Glottik” (“glottics”), which is 
a “Naturwissenschaft.”42  
 Yet Schleicher’s actual deployment of Darwin in this text displays little grasp of natural 
selection and is much more characterised by a vague adaptation of Bronn’s “Kampf um’s 
Daseyn” (“struggle for life”) to language. We are simply told that the Indo-Germanic languages 
could survive because of their higher level of organisation and perfection.43 Schleicher does 
quote a passage from Darwin in which the principle of variation is discussed,44 arguing that 
this principle is directly applicable to variation in language, but the mechanism of selection 
with respect to language is never addressed.45 This did not stop Schleicher from arguing in a 
later paper published in 1865 (six years before the Descent of Man), that the science of language 
or “die Glottik” provides evidence of “eine allmähliche Entwicklung des Menschen aus 
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niederen Formen” (“a gradual development of the human being out of lower forms”).46 The 
arguments used by Schleicher for this purpose can already be found in Die Darwinsche 
Theorie: articulate, conceptual or “meaningful sounds” (“Bedeutungslauten”) were, according 
to Schleicher, preceded by and developed out of “interjections” (“Lautgebärde”) and 
“imitations of noises” (“Schallnachahmungen”), with the latter two categories being readily 
observable among higher primates.47 These arguments would later be useful to Darwin, 
because they helped to open up an evolutionary continuum between humans and animals. In 
this, they are also similar to ideas proposed by both William Farrar (Essay on the Origin of 
Language, 1860) and Hensleigh Wedgwood (On the Origin of Language, 1866), both of whom 
are cited by Darwin in the Descent of Man, along with Schleicher himself.48  
 The relation between Schleicher and Darwin is therefore circular: beginning in 1863, 
and once again in 1865, Schleicher draws upon Bronn’s 1860 translation of On the Origin of 
Species (1859) in order to reinforce the scientific status of philology, now rebadged as “die 
Glottik”; later on, in 1871, Darwin in turn cites Schleicher in The Descent of Man to bolster 
his theories concerning a developmental continuum between primates and humans. Yet despite 
these filiations with Darwin, Schleicher’s Naturalisierung of Sprachwissenschaft via 
Darwinian means was, to use Heidelberger’s terms, neither ontological nor methodological. It 
was not ontological because Schleicher did not fully understand the mechanism of natural 
selection, invoking merely the category of higher organisation to explain why some languages 
survive and others die out. It was also not methodological because, lacking a true grasp of 
Darwinian ontology, Schleicher was incapable of developing hypotheses that could prove the 
operation of natural selection in language. For Schleicher, Darwinian natural selection served 
much more as an analogical or rhetorical device that was used to reinforce the prestige of his 
new science: die Glottik.   
 In her essay on “Darwin and the Growth of Language Theory,” Gillian Beer 
investigates precisely this reciprocal influence between theories of organic evolution and 
theories of language during the 1860s and 1870s.49 Beer’s analysis shows the extent to which 
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these increasingly virulent analogies were both scientifically useful and debilitating. The idea 
that languages are organisms was, she argues, initially useful for the development of an 
inductive method in nineteenth-century philology, as Hans Aarsleff has also shown.50 But it 
became misleading as soon as the language-as-organism analogy was taken to be a statement 
of ontological truth rather than a merely heuristic metaphor. As soon as this mistaken ontology 
took hold, according to Beer, it was  
 
high time for the two fields [i.e., evolutionary biology and philology, AN] to declare 
their independence of each other, to assert the autonomy of their studies and to 
obliterate for a while their lines of filiation. Their imagistic interconnections were 
beginning to flaw argumentative procedures, producing only a self-verifying exchange. 
The ricochet of terms to and fro between language theory and evolutionary theory was 
making the apparent proof of congruity too easy. Evolutionary theory henceforth turned 
towards genetics, and linguistics to synchronic laws.51  
 
As will shortly be demonstrated, the debate on language between Friedrich Max Müller and 
and William Dwight Whitney – a debate which also involved Darwin – was an important stage 
in the increasing separation of philology (and later linguistics, in the manner of Saussure) from 
evolutionary biology. 
 
Friedrich Max Müller: Fighting Darwin with Kantian Weapons 
Friedrich Max Müller, son of the philhellenic poet Wilhelm Müller (1794-1827), studied 
Sanskrit under Hermann Brockhaus (1806-1877) in Leipzig and comparative philology under 
Franz Bopp in Berlin, before transferring to London in 1846 to edit the manuscripts of the Rig 
Veda then held by the East India Company. What was initially planned as a research visit to 
Britain became a life-long stay when Müller was appointed as Taylorian Professor of Modern 
Languages at Oxford in 1854.52 Müller made his name as a comparative philologist and as the 
editor of the fifty-volume collection of Asian religious texts, The Sacred Books of the East 
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(1879-1910).53 His breakthrough work, a book-length essay on Comparative Mythology, 
appeared in 1856 and remained highly influential in British philology and in early British 
anthropology up until the 1870s.54 In that work, Müller had shown his philological dexterity 
by demonstrating similarities between ancient Greek and Sanskrit languages and myths.  
As the century progressed, the word ‘Science’ (in capitals) appeared ever more 
frequently in the titles of Müller’s books. The Lectures on the Science of Language first 
appeared in 1861, followed by an Introduction to the Science of Religion in 1873, and 
Contributions to the Science of Mythology in 1897. What Müller meant by ‘Science’ changed 
as the century progressed, and especially after the rise to prominence of Darwin. In general, 
his understanding of science moved from a systematic method involving comparison and the 
development of general laws based on induction (essentially philological Wissenschaft), to an 
increasing willingness to appropriate, sometimes quite ostentatiously, the rhetoric of ‘physical’ 
or natural science, especially the ideas of Darwin and Lyell. In this, the transition in Müller’s 
use of the term science mirrored a shift in general usage around the middle of the nineteenth 
century, which saw an incremental differentiation in German between Natur- and 
Geisteswissenschaft (natural and human science),55 and the increasingly exclusive association 
of the term ‘science’ in English with natural or ‘physical’ science.56  
 Yet Müller’s appropriations of Darwin were, from the beginning, ambivalent. In this 
connection, the story begins in 1860, the year in which the first series of the Lectures on the 
Science of Language was delivered, later to be published in 1861. Already in those lectures, 
Müller invokes the name of Darwin to explain why certain phonetic types or “language roots” 
prevail and others die out. “With the process of elimination, or natural selection,” according to 
Müller, “the historical element enters into the science of language,” and he likens this process 
of elimination to “that constant struggle which has been so well described in natural history as 
the struggle for life.”57  Müller was prepared to deploy the idea of natural selection in order to 
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explain why languages change over time, his basic idea being that the simplest and most useful 
expressions would inevitably triumph over those that were more long-winded and circuitous. 
Seen in this way, languages develop incrementally according to natural laws analogous to those 
found in Lyell’s Principles of Geology, with antiquated layers – like the myths of the classical 
world – containing linguistic ‘fossils’ that are buried under present-day usage. These geological 
principles, according to Müller in his second series of Lectures on the Science of Language 
(1864), “are equally applicable to the study of Philology.”58 One year earlier, Lyell had himself 
received Müller’s theories on the development of languages with enthusiasm in his work The 
Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man (1863), so that an atmosphere of reciprocal 
confirmation came to characterise the relation between these two important figures in mid 
nineteenth-century British science.59 
On account of Lyell’s well-known influence on Darwin’s Origin of Species,60 Müller 
would have seen him as an important scientific ally. But despite Müller’s invocation of the 
giants of British ‘physical science,’ his highly selective and tendentious reading of Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection can already be found in his second series of Lectures on the Science 
of Language, published in 1864. Here we are told that in language development, as in nature 
itself, “natural selection […] is inevitably rational selection […] it is the individual which 
comes nearest to the original intention of its creator […] that conquers in the great struggle for 
life.”61 Like Schleicher, Müller associates adaptive fitness or strength with perfection. He 
thereby fails to recognize that random variation, combined with the selective pressures exerted 
by natural environments, is the actual engine of natural selection, and that no guiding rationality 
is involved. In other words, Müller seems to have wanted Darwinian natural selection with a 
guiding creator at work in the background. This is a reading of Darwin that – even considering 
the concessions to religious sensitivities found in the Origin of Species – bears little relation to 
Darwin’s argument.  In Heidelberger’s terms, it is far more a partial Naturalisierung than it is 
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an Empirisierung, since a transcendent creator remains present in the background, and here 
Darwin’s ideas are also deployed on account of their rhetorical force. 
 This ‘transcendent’ element in Müller’s theory of language – an element which, as we 
shall see, is also ‘transcendental’ in the Kantian sense – comes to the fore when Müller 
addresses the subject of language in relation to the controversial issue of human descent. 
Through his networks in Germany, Müller was well aware of Schleicher’s interventions in this 
field, and he reviewed the English translation of Schleicher’s essay on Die Darwinische 
Theorie in an issue of Nature published in 1870.62 As early as 1860, in the first series of the 
Lectures on the Science of Language, Müller insists that the human use of articulate language 
is decisive in refuting all attempts to propose that humans evolved from non-human species: 
“the one great barrier between the brute [i.e., animal, AN] and man is Language. Man speaks, 
and no brute has ever uttered a word. Language is our Rubicon, and no brute will dare to cross 
it.”63 Müller then takes up this argument with renewed force in his three “Lectures on Mr. 
Darwin’s Philosophy of Language,” delivered at the Royal Institution in London from May to 
July 1873, as part of his response to the Descent of Man (1871). Here Müller’s chief witness 
in his attempted prosecution of Darwin is Kant.  Even though Müller occasionally used the 
expression “Back to Kant!” in his private correspondence,64 there is little evidence of him 
having been a neo-Kantian in the German sense, even if he might have taken consolation from 
the apparent rise in Kant’s fortunes during the second half of the nineteenth century. Müller 
even translated Kant’s first critique into English in 1881, and he describes this volume as his 
“constant companion through life” in the foreword to his translation.65  
With respect to the theme of Naturalisierung, Müller’s lectures on Darwin are a curious 
mixture.  On the one hand, language “roots” or “cells” are seen to underpin a “Biology” of 
language; yet on the other hand, these “roots” which Müller regards as “ultimate facts in the 
Science of Language” have their ultimate origin in the a priori concepts of human cognition 
identified by Kant.66  “Let us see,” writes Müller,  
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what roots are not. Roots are not either interjections or imitations […] what I formerly 
called Roots, or Phonetic Types, are indeed the ultimate facts in the analysis of 
language, but that, from a higher and philosophical point of view, they admit of a 
perfectly intelligible explanation. They represent the nuclei formed in the chaos of 
interjectional or imitative sounds; the fixed centres which become settled in the vortex 
of natural selection. The scholar begins and ends with these phonetic types; or, if he 
ignores them and traces words back to the cries of animals, or the interjections of men, 
he does so at his peril. The philosopher goes beyond, and he discovers the line which 
separates rational from emotional language, – conceptual from intuitional knowledge, 
– he discovers in the roots of all languages, the true barrier between Man and Beast.67 
 
Müller correctly presents Darwin’s ideas on the origin of language as being informed by the 
empiricism of Hume. Darwin applies Hume’s dictum “no ideas without impressions” to 
language, in that Darwin, like Farrar and Wedgwood, sees language as being based on either 
instinctive cries or on the imitation of impressions derived from external nature. Since both 
humans and some animals react to and imitate external impressions, the rudiments of linguistic 
capability cannot, for Darwin, be confined to the human sphere alone. It is on this basis that 
Darwin, writing in the Descent of Man, explicitly rejects Müller’s theory of language, 
favouring the positions of Wedgwood, Farrar and Schleicher.68   
In Müller’s view, Darwin fails to understand the real nature of articulate and conceptual 
language, because he does not consider Kant’s critique of Hume.69  Citing Bopp, Müller argues 
that articulate language is formed by language “roots.”70 Each language root, according to 
Müller, expresses a general concept, and “every root is an abstract term […] these roots, in 
their historical reality, mark a period in the history of the human mind – they mark the 
beginning of rational speech.”71 The capacity for rational speech, and for the formation of 
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general concepts in language roots, is thereby said to refute the notion that the human mind is 
a tabula rasa written upon by external impressions. The conceptual side of language, according 
to Müller, amounts to proof of the a priori rational faculties of humankind recognised by Kant. 
These a priori faculties are presented by Müller as the transcendental condition of possibility 
for articulate language. In this way, Müller believes himself to have created a radical and 
corrective break in the continuum between animal and human language opened by Farrar, 
Wedgwood, Schleicher and lastly Darwin. At the same time, however, Müller’s recourse to 
Kantian concepts as the ultimate origin of language roots would seem to reveal the purely 
metaphorical and rhetorical status of his so-called “Biology of language.” It is, in other words, 
difficult to see how a transcendental language root – that is, transcendental in the Kantian sense, 
as an a priori condition for possibility of rational speech per se – could at the same time have 
a prehistoric and empirical basis. In Müller’s case, as in that of Schleicher, we are therefore 
dealing with a rhetorical or analogical Naturalisierung which is only partial, since Müller wants 
to retain a transcendental principle – namely, the role played by a priori concepts – in the 
formation of what he calls human, rational and articulate language.   
 
Critics of Schleicher and Müller: Steinthal and Whitney 
The language-as-organism metaphor deployed by Schleicher and Müller found its two chief 
critics in Heymann Steinthal, co-founder of the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsycholgie und 
Sprachwissenschaft (Journal for Folk-Psychology and Language Science) and the American 
Indo-Germanist William Dwight Whitney, himself a student of German comparative philology 
who had studied with Bopp and with the Indologist Albrecht Weber (1825-1901) in Berlin, and 
with another German Indologist – Rudolph von Roth (1821-1895) – in Tübingen.72 In a passage 
from Steinthal’s review of Schleicher’s Zur Morphologie der Sprache (On the Morphology of 
Language, 1859), Steinthal already announces his preference for a mechanistic view of 
language, which he explicitly opposes to Schleicher’s organic or morphological position: 
 
Wenn die neuere Sprachwissenschaft darauf ausging, die Sprache als einen Organismus 
zu behandeln, so war sie hierdurch auch angewiesen, sich nach Analogie der 
Naturwissenschaft zu gestalten. Unseren Sprachforschern ist es daher längst geläufig, 
von einem mechanischen Wechsel und einem Gewicht des Lautstoffes, vom 
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anatomischen Bau der Sprache, von der physiologischen Functionen der Sprachtheile 
zu reden [...] Daß nun einerseits Herr Schleicher sich mit der natürlichen Morphologie 
genauer bekannt gemacht habe, müssen wir voraussetzen; aber hat er denn auch wohl 
andrerseits vorausgesetzt, der Leser werde mit dem heutigen Zustande jener Disciplin 
mehr oder weniger vertraut sein? Es scheint kaum; denn sonst hätte er ja voraussetzen 
müssen, der Leser werde wenigstens ungefähr wissen, daß und warum die Morphologie 
in der Naturwissenschaft bis heute noch wenig mehr als ein Desideratum ist.73 
 
If the most recent philology proceeded on the basis that language is to be treated as an 
organism, it was thereby required to model itself by way of analogy with the natural 
sciences. For this reason, it has long been prevalent among our language researchers to 
speak of a mechanical exchange and of the weight of sound-substance, of the 
anatomical structure of language and of the physiological function of elements of 
language [...] On the one hand, we must assume that Mr. Schleicher has made himself 
familiar with natural morphology; but on the other hand, has he indeed assumed that 
the reader would be more or less familiar with the present-day state of that discipline? 
It seems hardly, because otherwise he would also have had to presuppose that the reader 
would at least have a vague idea as to why morphology is still today little more than a 
desideratum in the natural sciences.  
 
Steinthal’s discussion of the problems associated with the organism metaphor deployed by 
Schleicher can best be understood in relation to Steinthal’s earlier study of 1855: Grammatik, 
Logik und Psychologie, ihre Principien und ihr Verhältniss zu einander (Grammar, Logic and 
Psychology, Their Principles and Their Relation to One Another). There Steinthal makes his 
case against the organic or morphological understanding of language perfectly clear:  
 
Das Wort organisch könnte für uns nur einen übertragenden Sinn haben, denn die 
Sprache gehört wesentlich dem Geiste, es ist ein geistiges Erzeugnis [...] Dieses Wort 
[d.h., organisch, AN] hat seine Epoche ausgelebt.’74  
                                                        
73Heymann Steinthal, ‘Mathematische Sprachwissenschaft’, Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft 1 (1860): 432-35; here: 432-3. 
 
74 Heymann Steinthal, Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie, ihre Principien und ihr Verhältniss zu einander 
(Berlin: Dümmler, 1855), 379. 
 
 21 
 
The word organic could have for us only a figurative meaning, since language 
essentially belongs to the mind, it is a mental product [...] This word [i.e., organic, AN] 
has outlived its epoch. 
 
For Steinthal, language could never be regarded as an empirical organism because it 
amounts to mental (“geistig”) operation. He took the opportunity to elaborate this view of 
language, in explicit opposition to Schleicher, in an extended review of Schleicher’s book Die 
Deutsche Sprache (1860).75  Again, the target of Steinthal’s polemic here is Schleicher’s claim 
that language is an organism. For Steinthal, this claim is based on the false assumption that 
“Sprache ist lautes Denken […] der lautliche Ausdruck des Gedankens” (“language is phonetic 
thought […] the phonetic expression of thought”).  According to this model, which Steinthal 
attributes to Schleicher, the sound or Laut is the material or ‘organic’ counterpart to a pre-
existing and rational form of thought. Crucially, for Steinthal, this means that it is impossible 
for feelings directly to be expressed in language, since they must be transformed into thoughts 
before they can come to expression.76   
Working against this dualistic model of thoughts coming to expression in sounds, 
Steinthal presents his own model of linguistic functioning, which displaces Schleicher’s 
organic model with a mechanistic continuum of sensations. To use Steinthal’s example in this 
essay: a pain in one’s finger is a physiological sensation which comes into perception once it 
crosses a certain threshold; the “Seele” (“soul”, by which Steinthal means “mind”) is thereby 
provoked to give expression to feelings of pain, and it does so by making associations with 
previous painful experiences, such as being “gestochen” (pricked or stabbed) by a needle. From 
this mental association, we derive the expression “man habe einen stechenden Schmerz” (in 
English: normally a ‘stabbing’ pain).77 Language thus brings about the representation of 
sensations which, according to the quantitative psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-
1841) favoured by Steinthal, amount to mechanistic forces that press for representation in the 
human mind once they pass over a threshold of intensity. In this way, mechanism replaces 
organism as the primary metaphor used for the understanding of language, and language 
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becomes the mental counterpart to both thoughts and physical sensations, which exist along 
the same continuum. For Steinthal, the mechanistic model is superior because mechanistic 
sensations may be susceptible of mathematical measurement according to their intensity. By 
contrast, the expression ‘organic’ belongs to an earlier epoch, presumably because it carries 
with it the tarnished legacies of romanticism and German idealism.  
Steinthal’s move towards the psychology of language also finds its analogue in the way 
in which the Junggrammatiker (neogrammarians or young grammarians) began to characterise 
the study of language as a ‘cultural science’ (Culturwissenschaft) rather than a natural science 
or ‘die Glottik’ – to use Schleicher’s term of differentiation from philology. Notwithstanding 
Hermann Paul’s (1846-1921) prominent critique of Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) and Steinthal, 
the methodological remarks to be found in the opening sections of his Principien der 
Sprachgeschichte (Principles of Language History, 1880) – a standard work of the 
Junggrammatiker – also describe the study of language as a Culturwissenschaft precisely 
because of its psychological basis: “die psychologie ist […] die vornehmste basis aller in einem 
höheren Sinne gefassten culturwissenschaft” (“psychology is most prominent basis of all 
cultural science, conceived in the higher sense of that term”).78 In opposition to the 
Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal, which Paul claims to be built purely on the basis 
of an individual psychology derived from Herbart,79 Paul emphasises the physiological and 
societal relations between humans as being equally important as psychological factors in 
elaborating a cultural science of language. But the crucial point here lies in the fact that by 
rejecting the organic model of Schleicher and replacing it with the mechanistic model of 
psychology, both Steinthal and Paul retreat from the claim that the study of language can be 
described as a natural science dealing with organisms.  
Because William Dwight Whitney published his works in English, he was forced not 
only to refute the ‘organic’ language claims of Schleicher but also those of his chief opponent 
in the English-speaking world: Müller.80 Although there were significant differences between 
Whitney’s position on language change and those theorised by the Junggrammatiker,81 it is 
important to mention that August Leskien (1840-1916) translated Whitney’s Life and Growth 
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of Language (1875) into German only a year after its first publication.82 Whitney shared two 
positions with the Junggrammatiker: first, a general rejection of the literal, as opposed to 
metaphorical, idea that language is an organism; and second: a commitment to gradual 
language change in the context of uniformitarianism. Saussure – who had himself worked with 
Leskien in Leipzig during 1876 and 1877 and who took detailed notes on Whitney83 – argued 
that Whitney in many ways prepared the way for the later positions of the Junggrammatiker.84 
Already in the 1867, in his Language and the Study of Language, Whitney was taking 
both Schleicher and Müller to task for suggesting that the language-as-organism hypothesis 
could be anything other than a metaphor: 
 
We see, I think, from our examination of the manner in which language is learned and 
taught, what is meant when we speak and write of it as having an independent or 
objective existence, as being an organism or possessing an organic structure, as having 
laws of growth, as feeling tendencies, as developing, as adapting itself to our needs, 
and so on. All these are figurative expressions, the language of trope and metaphor not 
of plain fact […] Language has, in fact, no existence save in the mouths and minds of 
those who use it; it is made up of separate articulated signs of thought, each of which 
is attached by a mental association to the idea that it represents, is uttered by voluntary 
effort, and has its value and currency only by the agreement of speakers and hearers 
[…] Language is, in fact, an institution […] the work of those whose wants it subserves 
[…] These considerations determine the character of the study of language as a 
historical or moral science. It is a branch of the history of the human race and of human 
institutions.85 
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This passage demonstrates how Whitney’s total rejection of the language-as-organism 
hypothesis made him an important figure for Saussure.86  Whitney proposes that language is 
based on a partially unconscious social consensus about the meanings of words. Its institutional 
character underlines its historical contingency and mutability according to changes in the 
community of speakers, and its signs are attached to the ideas which they represent purely by 
mental associations, which may in turn change depending upon cultural context.  
Whitney’s philosophy of language was developed via his reception of Scottish 
‘common sense’ theorists of language, especially Hugh Blair’s (1718-1800) Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), in which the author states that “the connexion between 
words and ideas may, in general, be considered as arbitrary and conventional” – a significant 
prefiguration of the more famous position of Saussure.87 Seen in this way, the arbitrary links 
between linguistic signs and their referents is made conventional by nothing more than 
processes of consensus within language communities that exceed the agency of any individual 
speaker. Such a philosophy of language did not require invocations of what Whitney referred 
to with some irony as “deeper and more mysterious parts of the mind”88; rather, it merely 
suggested that communities use certain words to refer to certain things, and that language 
change is attributable to gradual changes in such social conventions.  
In this respect, Whitney’s view of gradual language change was informed by the general 
heuristic framework of uniformitarianism based on an analogy with Lyell’s geology, and on an 
empiricist and imitative theory of the origin of language derived from Hensleigh Wedgwood. 
As part of his campaign against Müller, this allowed Whitney to form a strategic alliance with 
Charles Darwin, while also seeing him referenced by Darwin in the second (1874) edition of 
the Descent of Man as an authority explicitly opposed to Müller.89 Yet despite Whitney’s 
alliance with Darwin, what is important here is that the rejection of the organic model is aligned 
with the view that the study of language is decisively not natural-scientific but rather historical.  
Like Steinthal, Whitney can thus be described as a productive destroyer of the rhetoric of 
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Naturalisierung, and he would later go on to devote a whole volume to critiquing Müller’s 
‘organic’ claims about language.90  
As Roman Jakobson has shown in depth, Whitney’s powerful critique of the language-
as-organism metaphor exerted a decisive influence upon Saussure.91 In the Cours de 
linguistique générale, Max Müller and Schleicher are mentioned alongside Bopp as 
representatives of comparative philology. While Müller’s lectures are characterised by 
Saussure as having been “brilliant” yet “somewhat superficial,” Schleicher’s work is seen to 
represent a “systematisation of the science founded by Bopp.” Yet this science – comparative 
philology – is said to have failed to found a “true science of linguistics” because it remained 
preoccupied with comparing similarities between only two languages (ancient Greek and 
Sanskrit), and because it insisted upon the organic model of language growth. Only with the 
Junggrammatiker, according to Saussure, was the idea of “language as an organism developing 
of its own accord” dispensed with, so that language could now be seen as “a product of the 
collective mind of a linguistic community.”92 For Saussure, however, the real pioneer was 
Whitney. “In order to emphasise that a language is nothing other than a social institution,” 
writes Saussure, “Whitney quite rightly insisted upon the arbitrary character of linguistic signs. 
In so doing, he pointed linguistics in the right direction.”93  
   
Conclusion 
One of the guiding questions here has been the extent to which philology, as the forerunner to 
academic literary studies, imitated natural science to bolster its scientific credentials. The cases 
of Schleicher and Müller demonstrate that these imitations were highly strategic, forming part 
of what I would call the rhetoric of Naturalisierung. 
In Schleicher’s case, a grander historical argument about the perfection and decay of 
languages and nations appears to have been abandoned so that Lyell and Darwin could be taken 
on board. The only remnant of German idealism that persists is Schleicher’s monism, which is 
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part of the generally curious reception of Darwin in Germany described by Philip Ajouri.94  
Schleicher’s application of Darwin’s ideas to language shows little understanding of the 
mechanism of natural selection, even if Darwin was prepared to cite Schleicher as a witness 
against Müller in the Descent of Man.  
Müller’s accommodations of Darwin were even more strategic, because for Müller in 
Britain, Darwin was a local problem that had to be confronted head on. In the 1860s, Müller 
opportunistically deployed the language of natural selection to explain language development, 
initially misreading Darwin – either deliberately or out of ignorance – as having proposed a 
teleological version of natural selection. But when the full implications of natural selection for 
questions of human descent became clear, Müller mounted a rear-guard action against Darwin 
that relied on Müller’s attempt to revive the fortunes of Kant in Britain. This ‘back to Kant’ 
campaign was wholly unsuccessful because it was contradictory: it was logically impossible 
for language “roots” to be empirical on the one hand (for example, as the so-called “cells” of 
language), yet also the embodiment of transcendental a priori concepts on the other. 
The critiques of the language-as-organism hypothesis offered by Steinthal and Whitney 
are of significance not only for the history of linguistics but also for the history of the 
humanities – including the history of literary studies – in general. My short reconstruction of 
Scherer’s and Moulton’s attempts to conceive of literary studies along the lines of a natural 
scientific model demonstrates the prestige exerted by the natural sciences during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Any suggestion of speculative arguments or normative value 
judgements in the then nascent discipline of academic literary studies was strenuously to be 
avoided by appealing to the purportedly ‘empirical’ facts that would underlie this new field. 
That these ‘facts’ would – at least for Scherer and for the young Dilthey of “Über die 
Einbildungskraft der Dichter” (1878), an essay published in the Zeitschrift für 
Völkerpsychologie – end up being based in the psychology and biography of the author 
demonstrates the proximity of German literary studies to the linguistic work of Lazarus and 
Steinthal during this period.  
In this respect, Steinthal’s and Hermann Paul’s movement away from the organic model 
of language science and towards the mechanistic model of psychology may have represented 
a breakthrough for literary studies, but one which ended in the cul-de-sac of biographical 
criticism and obsessive Editions-Wissenschaft, a powerful academic model from which 
Goethe-Studies, to cite just one prominent German example, is still emerging. This important 
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tendency in German criticism can already be found in Scherer’s famous essay on “Goethe 
Philologie” (1877), in which he praises the Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal as a 
non-speculative – and, importantly, non-Hegelian – variant of the philosophy of history, and 
in which he positively reviews a series of biographically oriented editions of Goethe’s works, 
such as Salamon Hirzel’s collection of Goethe’s early poems and letters,95 and Gustav von 
Loeper’s heavily annotated edition of Dichtung und Wahrheit.96 The philological purpose of 
such editions is, according to Scherer, to research “den Enstehungsprozeß des Werkes” (“the 
work’s process of formation”) within what he calls the “Seele des Autors” (“soul of the 
author”).97 Such an approach to literary criticism would seem to be completely naïve and 
antiquated to us today. 
Yet when one takes the longer view, considering Whitney’s influence upon Saussure, 
and via Saussure upon literary theory of the twentieth century, his importance seems to be 
immense. Here it is useful to draw an analogy between the respective emergences of 
philosophical hermeneutics and structuralism as methods in literary studies.  It was Dilthey 
who paved the way for modern philosophical hermeneutics by eventually abandoning the 
positivist model of author psychology outlined in “Über die Einbildungskraft der Dichter” 
(1878), published in Lazarus and Steinthal’s Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie under the 
influence of their scientific psychology. He did so by arguing, some five years later, for the 
“selbstständige Constituierung der Geisteswissenschaften” (“independent creation of the 
human sciences”) in his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883).98  This breakthrough 
book  announced a vision of the humanities which sees all products of the human mind as being 
informed not only by individual psychology, but also by the historical and social contexts of 
both the author and the always belated and historically distanced reader. 
In a similar way, the real breakthrough in literary structuralism appears to have emerged 
from a total rejection of natural scientific models in favour of the radical contingency of 
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language as a social human institution, an idea emphasised by Whitney, which emerged from 
his vehement rejection of earlier ‘organic’ models of language development like those 
promoted by Schleicher and Müller in their attempts to harness the prestige of the natural 
sciences. Though hermeneutics and structuralism rarely crossed paths in the twentieth century, 
they did come to similar conclusions about the relativity of meaning in literary texts, albeit via 
different intellectual lineages. When seen from this longer historical perspective, one thing that 
unites them may be their rejection of natural scientific models at their respective origins; in 
other words, both hermeneutics and structuralism concluded that the human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften) must operate with different principles to those found in the natural 
sciences. In this way, they resisted the seductive call of Naturalisierung and bravely set out 
upon a path of inquiry that better suited the linguistic and cultural materials with which they 
were dealing.99  It remains to be seen what implications these historical facts may have for the 
new generation of theorists who are once again calling for a literary criticism based on 
Darwinian biology; at the very least, they would do well to consider why theorists of the late 
nineteenth century concluded that language and literature could not be properly understood 
using exclusively natural scientific models.  
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